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Abstract 
 
Despite two decades of the Common Fishery Policy (CFP), the fishery politics of the 
European Union (EU) is considered a failure when it comes to securing fish-stocks. 
This paper explores reasons to this state of affairs by analysing the views and opinions 
among those subjected to regulations, namely professional fishermen (in Sweden). 
Since the capacity of any natural management regime to protect the resources depends 
on appropriators’ compliance, the prospects of sustainable natural management 
depends on improved understanding of when and why appropriators consent, and 
ultimately comply, with a regulative policy. So, when do fishermen comply with a 
fishery management regime? Instrumental views give a straightforward explanation; 
when the risk of being caught is considered high (and the potential economic profit of 
rule-breaking is low). More normative views point at various “qualities of 
government” such as procedural fairness, distributive justice, trust and legitimacy, but 
is much less specified in terms of actual explanations to appropriators’ actions. This 
paper adds a piece to the compliance puzzle by, relying on the model presented by 
Levi(1997), exploring the importance of 1) imbalanced burdens and 2) trust in 
authorities. Results confirm the importance of trust in authorities but contradict the 
idea that experiences of imbalance in burdens have a negative effect on legitimacy. 
Strikingly enough, fishermen who believe that other governments take greater 
concern in their fishing-fleets than the Swedish government, value the principles of 
Swedish fishery politics more. 
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Why Accept State Regulations?  
What make us accept and comply with regulations we are subjected to by the 
state? According to the instrumental approaches launched in the economic 
literature, it is mostly a matter of the sanctions that might follow if we chose not 
to. According to more normative approaches launched in political science and 
sociology this has also to do with a number of assessments we make concerning 
the process and outcome of policy: procedural fairness, distributive justice, trust 
and legitimacy. An implication of the normative approach is that with diverseness 
in implementation and exercise of policy, comes the risk of undermined legitimacy 
and a lower degree of compliance as a consequence. European fishery policy bears 
characteristics of diverseness in the sense that member-states may be more or less 
ambitious in implementing the Common Fishery Politics (CFP). According to the 
normative approach we should therefore expect the fishermen of EU member 
states to – once they have discovered the imbalances in burdens between 
fishermen of different nationalities – be less inclined both to trust the regime and 
to consider it as legitimate. The empirical findings presented in this paper, 
however, partly contradict these expectations.   
    
European Fishery: A Common Policy with Imbalanced Burdens 
Fish, as a global common, creates collective action problems on at least two levels. 
First, the short-term interest of each single fishing crew to maximize their catch 
runs contrary to the long term collective good of sustainable fishery and preserved 
fish-stocks. Second, while the collectively preferable strategy for all states would 
be to impose consistent regulations and supervision, each state has a short term 
interest to provide relatively soft conditions for their own fleet. The standard 
solution to escape these kinds of collective action problems is various forms of 
cooperation, such as setting up common rules and sanctions to prevent free-
riding.1 If one considers the general cooperative structure of the European Union 
(EU) and the issue-specific cooperation in the Common Fishery Politics (CFP), one 
might therefore expect that over-exploitation is a minor problem in European 
fishing-waters. Especially since the CFP has been running for two decades – long 
enough to develop efficient supra-national institutional arrangements to reduce 
incentives for states and fishing-crews to free-ride.  
 
However, this is clearly not the case. The fishery politics of the European Union is 
severely criticized and judged a failure by several crucial actors such as the 
European Court of Auditors.2 One important shortcoming revealed by a study 
carried out by the EU Commission indicates that there is a high degree of 
misreporting of catches. Inspections in the Baltic Sea 2005/2006 show that 
                                          
1 The risk of over-exploitation and degradation of common pool resources (CPR), such as fish 
stocks, has - of course - most famously been captured in Garrett Hardin’s metaphor “The Tragedy 
of the Commons” where “freedom in the commons brings ruin to all” (Hardin 1968:1244).  
2 The European Court of Auditors. Särskild rapport nr 7/2007. 
inspected vessels quite systematically report larger catches than non-inspected 
vessels.3 For Latvian vessels, the discrepancy was 8 percent, for Swedish vessels it 
was 21 percent, and for Polish vessels 48 percent. Assumingly, plain cheating is a 
core (although not necessarily the only) cause for this discrepancy in landings.  
 
Another highlighted incongruity in the CFP is that it involves imbalances of the 
burdens imposed on fishermen. Such disproportions are potentially risky since 
they are assumed to negatively impact the legitimacy of the regime as well as the 
trust in authorities- at least among the offended groups.4 The theoretical 
foundations of this argument are further elaborated later in this paper, but it 
should be noted already at this stage that it is not the objective distribution of 
burdens that is in focus. Rather, the core of the matter is how fishermen perceive 
the balance and imbalance of burdens. The purpose of this paper is to test whether 
Swedish fishermen’s perceptions of their relative burdens within the CFP impact 
their trust in the national fishery authorities (Swedish Board of Fisheries, SBF) and 
the degree to which they consider the regulations legitimate. Judging from earlier 
research and official reports, there are at least two sources of perceived imbalance 
in burdens.  
 
Burden as governmental concern. The Common Fishery Policy (CFP) of the 
European Union involves a resource management element. The resource 
management aims at recovering and preserving the resource stocks through 
regulations such as catch limits, quotas, protected areas, restricted access zones, 
effort limits and gear restrictions. The shape and content of these regulations are 
the result of national governments negotiating with each other. Swedish 
fishermen have perceptions of in which degree the Swedish government takes the 
interests of the fishing industry into consideration in these negotiations. They 
evaluate how concerned their government is compared to how concerned other 
governments are for their fishing fleets.  
 
The positions and strategies of a government depend on a number of factors such 
as the relative importance of fisheries, the size of the fishing fleet and the strength 
of the fishery lobby.5 The principle of relative stability set frames for the 
distributions of fishing rights and quotas among the member countries. Still, the 
bargaining about the TAC levels as such can, in the minds of fishermen, indicate 
whether their government shows low or high concern for the fishing industry.  
 
Ever since the first days of the CFP, there have been substantial differences 
between countries when it comes to formulating the CFP and decides on 
regulations. In a study on the negotiations of the 2003 CFP reform, two main 
                                          
3 “Evaluation report in catch registration in Baltic-sea member states” (January, 2007).  
4 European Court of Auditors.  Särskild rapport 7/2007 
5 Lequesne 2004, SLI 2006, Hasselberg 1997. 
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camps were identified.6 One camp is the “friends of the fishery”, consisting of 
mainly southern states such as Spain and France. This group of countries tends to 
resist restrictive measures and lowering of TACs, assumingly since political 
mechanisms instigate them to satisfy demands of fishermen organizations and to 
take socioeconomic factors into consideration. Another group is the “friends of the 
fish” with among others Germany and Sweden. This group tends to promote 
relatively restrictive policies, even though they also – of course – to some extent 
play by the demands of the fishing industry and take socioeconomic concerns. 
 
Figure 1. Fishermen’s perceptions of the relative concern for the fisher profession among European 
governments compared to the Swedish government (percent in each category). 
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EU governments in 
general much less 
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EU governments in 
general much more 
concerned than Sweden
 
Notes: Data comes from a survey to Swedish fishermen. The exact question wording was 
“Compared to the Swedish government, do you think that the governments below take less, more 
or about the same concern to the fisher professions of their countries?” (A 5 degree scale from 
much less concern to much more concern). n=450 
 
The picture of Sweden as a friend of the fish rather than a friend of the fishery 
receives quite strong support among Swedish fishermen. According to figure 1 
above, the general opinion among Swedish fishers is that the governments of other 
EU countries are more concerned about the situation for their fishermen than the 
Swedish government is for Swedish fishermen. In this paper, we concentrate on 
the perceived differences between the Swedish government and EU governments 
in general.7 Figure 1 reveals that 69 percent (39+30) of the respondents are leaning 
toward the opinion that EU governments in general are more concerned and only 
10 percent (6+4) indicate that the Swedish government is more concerned.8  
 
Burden as intense monitoring. The other source of perceived imbalanced burdens 
is the intensity of monitoring. Even though the fisheries policies are common, the 
monitoring is a national responsibility. Member states are obliged to effectively 
monitor the compliance of CFP decisions in their territorial waters and in their 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The problem is, however, that there are no 
specified authorized instructions on how to interpret and perform these tasks. In 
the absence of common monitoring norms, a diverse array of national systems 
                                          
6 SLI 2006, see also Lequesne 2004. 
7 Survey material also contains comparisons between the Swedish government and a number of 
individual countries.  
8 The former social democratic government is perceived as somewhat less concerned than the 
current right-wing government which took office in 2006. 
 3
have emerged, each with its own characteristics, strategies, capacity and 
opportunities. Hence, EU fishermen subordinated to a common set of regulations 
confront different monitoring regimes. As stated in a report from the EU Court of 
Auditors, the disparate character of the monitoring system facilitates for fishermen 
to portray the monitoring methods of their own country as discriminating or 
unreasonably harsh.9 In the end, this might lower the trust in fishery authorities 
and the inclination to comply with CFP regulations.  
 
Figure 2. Fishermen’s perceptions of the relative extent of national monitoring systems (percent in 
each category). 
 
1 2 14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  The data come from a survey to Swedish fishermen. The item accounted for here was 
included in a battery in which the head question wording was “In general, do you consider 
Swedish fishermen to be monitored more, less or to fairly the same extent as the following 
professions?” Respondents answered using a 5 point scale ranging from (1) Swedish fishermen are 
much less monitored than fishermen of other EU countries, and (5) Swedish fishermen are much 
more monitored than fishermen of other EU countries. n=633. Respondents indicating “no 
opinion” excluded. 
 
According to figure 2 above, it is no doubt how Swedish fishermen in general 
estimate the relative monitoring burdens of Swedish fishermen and fishermen of 
other nationalities; Swedes are more monitored than others. A whole 61 percent 
think that Swedes are much more monitored than others, and another 22 percent 
indicate that they are at least more monitored than other nationalities.10 It is 
interesting to study the figures above in the light of the debate of fishery politics 
in Sweden. The Swedish management system is considered equally inefficient as 
the CFP when it comes to securing fish-stocks. But in contrast to the numbers in 
figures 1 and 2, the more recent critique views the Swedish Board of Fisheries as 
an organization that represents rather than monitors Swedish fishermen.11  
 
Still, however, the national Swedish debate also elucidates strong disagreements 
between professional fishermen and the Swedish Board of Fisheries. In fact, 
fishermen seem to be at clinch with most other actors: They challenge scientists’ 
estimations of stock-sizes, they are dissatisfied with quota sizes, with the 
                                          
9 European Court of Auditors.  Särskild rapport 7/2007 
10 It is difficult to say whether these numbers are high or low. However, fishermen’s evaluations of 
whether they are more or less monitored than Swedish farmers and forestry shows even larger 
perceived differences. 66% think that they are much more monitored than Swedish farmers, and 
73% that they are much more monitored than the Swedish forestry. 
11 Lövin (2007). 
22 61 
Swedish fishermen are 
much more monitored 
than others 
Swedish fishermen are 
much less  monitored 
than others 
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supervision they are put under, and with the general – yet unfair – image of 
fishermen as notorious rule-breakers.12 While this paper explores dynamics not 
directly related to economic conditions, it is obviously close at hand to suspect 
that their dissatisfaction with other parties, as well as the content of current 
policies, is strongly associated with the fact that Swedish fishermen suffer 
economically from the regulations and limitations of fishery-rights. Hence, the 
analysis to come will include economic explanations as well. The coming sections 
introduce our theoretical model and chisel out three connected hypotheses on 
how imbalanced burdens, trust and legitimacy are connected.  
 
The Economic Model vs. Governing the Commons 
To rely on the economic approach when trying to improve institutional capacity 
suggests a further focus on monitoring and credible (harsher) sanctions, since 
fishermen are likely to violate regulations as long as cheating is likely to lead to 
economic gains and unlikely to lead to punishment. However, starting with Elinor 
Ostrom, CPR-research presents rather disheartening news about the usefulness of 
top-run management systems.13 Ostrom has been followed by a number of studies, 
separable in a co-operative and a co-management approach, of how various 
institutional arrangements can produce successful management practises for fish 
stocks (and other CPRs).14 This has brought along a shift in the understanding of 
appropriators’ behaviour in the sense that non-coercive compliance mechanisms 
are taken into account. These views suggest that also at conditions when non-
compliance potentially leads to economic benefit, appropriators could still decide 
to comply with regulations on the basis of normative considerations about 
procedure, distributive justice and trustworthiness. Through the focus on 
normative considerations, these views more or less outspokenly assume that there 
is a link between whether appropriators consider policy as legitimate and their 
                                          
12 Illustrative examples can be found in Göteborgs Posten (2006-03-20). See also Rapporter från 
riksdagen 2007/08:RFR3.  
13 Ostrom (1990). Ostrom criticises the two most commonly suggested ways out of the social 
dilemma; market solutions and interventions of an external authority. She objects both against the 
theoretical presumptions of the game-theoretic models as such, and to the treatment of “the 
tragedy” as an empirical fact. Moreover, she shows how appropriators within a geographically 
demarcated fishery can achieve a sustainable usage of the resource, by establishing local 
arrangements and agreements. Thus, when local users are responsible for the management of the 
fish stocks, one can expect that their enthusiasm to comply with the rules, as well as their capacity 
to adapt to changes in the eco-system, rises.  
14 A specified distinction between these approaches can be made: In the co-operative perspective, 
rather than securing the resource through coercion, self-management depends on participants 
accepting regulations as just or legitimate. In the co-management perspective, even though this 
approach implies a larger involvement of state authorities, appropriators’ influence on the decision-
making process as well as their capacity to make and implement regulatory-systems is emphasized 
(see Honneland, 2002). See also Ostrom, Dietz & Stern (2003); Jentoft (2000); Nielsen (2003). For 
studies in a Swedish context, see for example Rova (2004) and Píriz (2004). See also Honneland 
(2002).  
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inclination to comply with regulations.15 Considering that this normative (as 
oppose to instrumental) view also seems to inform reform proposals of policy, the 
shortage of clear-cut empirical support is somewhat surprising. In the next section, 
we return to the seminal work on citizens’ consent carried out by Margret Levi, in 
order to set up a model useful for the field of fishery management. 
 
Conditions of Rule Acceptance  
In contestation to the economic model of compliance and institutional 
effectiveness, stands a literature in political science and sociology that stresses 
normative matters of compliance.16 A distinction can be made between theories 
that underline the importance of procedural justice on the one hand, and 
distributive justice on the other, where the former focus on matters such as 
whether one had a say in the process and the latter rather concerns the fairness of 
the outcome of the decision. Margret Levi(1997) makes an influential contribution 
on the matter of compliance that actually touches upon both these aspects. She 
presents a model where compliance is dependent on appropriators’ assessments of 
1) government trustworthiness, and 2) ethical reciprocity.17 Levi argues that 
citizens, before they decide whether to comply with policy, evaluate the 
trustworthiness of the government on the basis of the capacity of the government 
(in the past as well as the future) to make credible commitments, and on whether 
the procedures for making and implementing policy meets prevailing standards of 
fairness. The evaluation of ethical reciprocity concerns whether other members of 
the community also contribute; If a citizen concludes that others do not keep their 
part of the agreement, this citizen’s “contingent consent” is likely to break down.18 
Thus, Levi’s line of reasoning includes a definitional distinction between 
compliance and consent.  
  
Consent and compliance can be seen as related in the sense that not consenting 
with a policy might increase the likelihood of non-compliant behaviour. Still, they 
are not necessarily the same, since one might comply with regulations without 
necessarily consenting with it - for instance because non-compliant behaviour 
simply might inherit the risk of sanctions. However, Levi (1997) argues that non-
compliance is more serious than non-consent in the sense that it is a behavioural 
response which raises the cost of implementation, and thereby always challenges 
policy.19 Thus, not consenting with policy is something one may do silently, 
without taking action. Levi escapes the mistake to take passivity as a sign of 
                                          
15 Levi (1997); Dietz et al (2003); Grimes (2006); Jentoft (1999).   
16 Eggert & Ellegård (2002); Levi (1997); Dietz et al (2003); Ostrom (2005); Gezelius (2002, 2004, 
2006).   
17 Levi (1997:23-26). See also Grimes (2006:17). In addition, there are theoretical arguments about 
the impact of norms as important to understand prevailing levels of compliance with state 
regulations. See Gezelius (2002, 2004, 2006).     
18 Levi (1997:24f).  
19 Levi (1997:17).  
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consent, by the specification “contingent consent”; constituted through trust in 
government and ethical reciprocity. She argues that contingent consent leads to 
compliance also in the absence of strong ideological conviction and/or lack of 
material incentives. Thereby, what Levi refers to as contingent consent seems 
largely similar to legitimacy, at least according to a comprehensive understanding 
of legitimacy as a “reservoir of loyalty”.20  
 
Legitimacy. What legitimacy actually means, and how institutions and policy 
become legitimate, are contested issues. For instance, there is the question of 
whether legitimacy is “in the eyes of the beholder”, or an intrinsic property of the 
object as such.21 There is also the complex issue of legitimacy as dependent on 
both legality and morality; legitimacy is not necessarily established in the moment 
a specific order is made into a law (neither are all normative guidelines considered 
legitimate).22 In fact, the normative view of compliance underlines the 
circumstance that non-compliance occurs also in the presence of laws, but suggests 
that this could be in response to a normative devaluation of procedures related to, 
and content of policy. Thus, the crux is to establish whether non-compliance takes 
place as a response only to economic incentives, or if the normative considerations 
contributes to make compliant behaviour more or less likely. According to Levi,  
the most crucial normative assessments concerns 1) government’s trustworthiness 
and 2) ethical reciprocity. Studying Swedish fishermen in the context of the CFP, 
we suggest that these normative assessments may be specified as 1) burden as 
governmental concern, and 2) burden as monitoring. Our line of reasoning is 
presented in the following.  
 
Trust & Fairness. The management-approaches brought the concept of trust into 
the analysis of compliance and regime efficiency in CPR.23 Trust among 
individuals in a group (or between groups) is expected to have a positive impact on 
the level of compliance in the sense that people become more inclined to 
contribute to the common good. If each competing party trusts that the 
competitors will follow the rules of the common use of a natural resource, then 
this presence of trust will increase the likeliness that all parties will comply and 
thus generating more collective goods in the longer term. To quote Ostrom “No 
one wants to be a ‘sucker’ keeping a promise that everyone else is breaking”.24 
Thus a firm belief that no one else follows prevailing regulations undermines an 
                                          
20  Tyler (1990); see also Nielsen(2000:427).  
21 Jentoft (2000:143).  
22 Jentoft (2000:142). See also Nielsen (2003).  
23 Ostrom (1990); see also Putnam (1993); Offe (1999).  
24 Trust among (unrelated) individuals, has also proven important for peoples’ willingness to 
contribute to the general welfare, e.g., by paying tax. See Torgler (2004); Roth et al. (1989). 
Yamagishi & Yamagishi (1994); Scholz & Lubell (1998); Torgler (2003a, 2003b, 2004).C.f., Uslaner 
2002 for an illuminating more general discussion about similarities and differences between 
individual-level trust among strangers and within social groups (e.g., Hells Angels). 
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already weak incentive to spare the resource for the future. This implies that in 
order to consider policy as legitimate, an assessment concerning ethical reciprocity 
should lead to the conclusion that there is a fair balance in burdens between 
oneself and others also subjected to the regulations of a policy.   
 
Levi’s model of compliance keeps separate the normative considerations about 
relevant political actors’ trustworthiness and fairness in burdens. Citizens are 
assumed to evaluate on the one hand how reliable their own government is and, 
on the other hand, the extent to which others also are subjected to regulations. In 
the context of the CFP, we rather suggest that these normative considerations are 
integrated in the sense that the evaluations Swedish fishermen make about the 
government’s trustworthiness actually concerns the matter of ethical reciprocity 
in relationship to fishermen of other EU-nationalities. Thus, if there is a negative 
interpretation of Swedish fishery policy, characterised as “friendship with the fish” 
rather than “friendship of the fishery”, Swedish fishermen might experience an 
imbalance in burdens in relationship to fishermen of other EU-nationalities. This 
could undermine the legitimacy of policy.  
 
In addition to these kinds of normative assessments, with trustworthiness and 
ethical reciprocity integrated, there is of course also the matter of whether 
fishermen trust the authorities of the regime. Empirical findings suggest that trust 
in institutions, including the legal system, the government and public officials, has 
a significant positive effect on policy compliance.25 The trustworthiness of an 
institution among citizens depends on whether it has, for instance, emerged 
properly, is founded on appropriate knowledge and principles, is adequately 
administered and the effects clearly designated.26 On the other hand, if a citizen 
has reasons to believe that the institution performs badly, this is expected to lead 
to a decline in trust that also might have an impact on whether the institution is 
considered legitimate.  
 
Theoretical Specifications: Imbalanced Burdens, Trust and Legitimacy  
This article has so far searched for available theoretical understandings –  
complementing or competing with the economic model – of appropriators’ 
compliance with state regulations. Relying on Levi’s model of compliance we 
suggest first, that contingent consent is largely similar to regime legitimacy and 
second, that as potential causes of regime legitimacy, assessments of governments 
trustworthiness and ethical reciprocity are integrated. Thus, when Swedish 
fishermen evaluate Swedish fishery politics in the context of the CFP, they take 
into account their share of the burden in relation to fishermen of other 
nationalities. This could have an impact on the legitimacy of the regime. 
Moreover, this assessment could also impact whether they consider the regime as 
                                          
25 See e.g. Scholz & Lubell (1998); Torgler (2003a, 2003b, 2004).  
26 Rothstein(2003).  
 8
trustworthy. Finally, on the basis of previous studies on the importance of trust, 
we should expect an independent effect of trust in authorities and the extent to 
which the regime is considered legitimate.   
 
Our three hypotheses can be specified as follows:  
 
H1: Assessments of whether government reassures ethical reciprocity (i.e. balance 
in burdens) impact the legitimacy of the regime.   
 
H2: Trust in authorities impact the legitimacy of the regime.  
 
H3: Assessments of whether government reassures ethical reciprocity (i.e. balance 
in burdens) impact the legitimacy of the regime.  Hence, some of the effects 
regarding ethical reciprocity on legitimacy are channeled through trust in the 
authorities.  
 
Figure 3. Graphical summary of the hypothesized relationships between assessments about balance 
in burdens, trust and legitimacy. Each hypothesis is illustrated with an arrow. 
  
 
Balance in 
burdens 
Legitimacy
Trust
 H3 H2
H1
 
 
 
 
Methods, Measures and Model Specifications 
The empirical data consist of a survey to all 1863 licensed professional fishermen 
in Sweden.27 The overall response rate was 48%. To evaluate the support for our 
hypotheses and, in more general terms, elaborate the relationship between 
perceived relative burdens, trust and legitimacy we conducted one path analysis 
for each of the relative burden indicators governmental concern and monitoring. 
The path analysis helps us to capture the direct, indirect and total effects of 
perceived relative burden.  
 
Model specification. We ran two OLS regressions per burden factor, one with 
Legitimacy (LEGITIMACY) as dependent variable, and one with trust in the 
Swedish Board of Fisheries (TRUST) as dependent variable. Apart from these 
variables and the variables measuring perceived imbalance in burdens, the 
                                          
27 Number refers to the time of the surveying period, fall 2007. 
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multivariate OLS models take into account the control variables economy and 
general trust. Economy is included to evaluate the effects of imbalanced burden 
under control for the relative economic situation of each respondent. To capture 
the effects of regime specific trust, we also remove the effects of political trust in 
general, which is done with the variable general trust. It refers to the general level 
of trust in political institutions other than the key fishery authority in Sweden, 
which is the Swedish Board of Fisheries (SBF).  
 
To capture the direct effect of respective burden factor on legitimacy (the upper 
arrow - H1 - in the causal model), and the effect of trust on legitimacy (the 
upwards sloping far right arrow - H2 - in the causal model) we ran an OLS model: 
 
LEGITIMACY= b0 + b1 RELATIVE BURDEN  +  b2 TRUST  + b3 ECONOMY + b4 GENERAL TRUST + e 
 
To be able to capture the indirect effect of perceived relative burden on 
legitimacy, i.e the effects of burden channelled through trust, we need to evaluate 
the effect of perceived burden on trust in the Swedish Board of Fisheries (SBF) 
(the downward sloping arrow - H3 - in the causal model). Hence, we ran an OLS 
model: 
 
TRUST= b0 + b1 RELATIVE BURDEN  b3 ECONOMY + b4 GENERAL TRUST + e 
 
The total effect of perceived relative burdens on legitimacy is equal to the direct 
effect (H1) plus the indirect effect. The indirect effect equals the product of arrows 
H3 and H2.  
 
Variable measurements. Legitimacy was measured with a three item summated 
index, transformed into a 0-10 scale. Two of the items indicate the degree to 
which respondents think that regulations fulfil core tasks of the regime. The third 
concerns whether respondents think that regulations are founded on reasonable 
estimations of fish stock conditions.  
 
The items indicating task fulfilment are drawn from the question How important 
is the following reasons for you to comply with existing regulations? We use 
respondents’ ratings of the sub-alternatives “The regulations contribute to a 
sustainable fishery” and “The regulations contribute to protect marine 
environments”. The rating scale ranges from (1) “Completely unimportant reason” 
to (5) “Very important reason”. The third index item was drawn from the question 
How acceptable is the following reasons for rule infringements? and the ratings of 
the sub-alternative “The rules are founded upon incorrect estimations of stock 
sizes”. The rating scale ranges from (1) “Completely unacceptable reason” to (5) 
“Completely acceptable reason”. The responses on this last item were reversed in 
order to fit the numerical logics of the other two items. High points on the three 
items hence indicate a high level of legitimacy.  
 10
 
Regime specific trust was measured as trust in the Swedish Board of Fisheries 
(SBF). Respondents rated their trust on a five point scale from “very low” to “very 
high” trust. High numbers corresponds to high levels of trust and vice versa. The 
exact wording of the head question was What is your trust in the way in which 
the following societal institutions and groups perform their work? 
 
The “imbalanced burden” variables measure whether respondents feel more or less 
monitored than fellow fishermen from other countries, and whether they perceive 
that their government takes more or less concern than other governments to the 
fishery. The perceptions of relative monitoring were measured with the question 
In general, do you consider Swedish fishermen to be monitored more, less or to 
fairly the same extent as the following professions? Here, we use ratings (5-point 
scale) of the sub-alternative “Fishermen of other EU-countries”. The perceptions 
of relative governmental concern was measured with the question Compared to 
the Swedish government, do the governments below take less, more or fairly the 
same concern to the interests of their professional fishermen? In this paper, we use 
the comparisons (5-point scale) between the Swedish government and the sub-
alternative “EU-countries in general”. 
 
The variable “general trust” is an index composed by measurements of trust in the 
law courts, banks, the home town authority of each respondent, the Swedish 
Social Insurance Agency and the Swedish government. Respondents were asked to 
rate their trust on a five point scale from “very low” to “very high” trust. High 
numbers correspond to high levels of trust and vice versa. The exact wording of 
the head question was What is your trust in the way in which the following 
societal institutions and groups perform their work? 
 
Economy was measured with respondents’ answers to the question How do you 
assess you economic situation compared to the average professional fisherman? 
Respondents were asked to rate their situation on a five point scale ranging from 
“much worse than average” to “much better than average”.  
 
Mapping Regime Legitimacy and Institutional Trust  
As we have discussed in the theoretical sections, legitimacy seems to be a key 
element in an effective fishery management regime. It is assumed to raise the 
levels of compliance, and lower the need for coercive measures. While we 
acknowledge the link between legitimacy and compliance/effectiveness in 
theoretical terms, our empirical focus is on the creation of legitimacy. More 
exactly, we investigate the link between perceived fairness of burdens, 
institutional trust and legitimacy. We measure legitimacy by an index composed of 
three questions. Two of them estimate the degree to which respondents think that 
regulations fulfil core tasks of the regime. The third concerns whether respondents 
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think that regulations are founded on reasonable estimations of fish stock 
conditions.28  
 
As a group, Swedish fishermen seem to consider the regime as at least fairly 
legitimate. Figure 4 below shows that the centre of gravity in the aggregated 
legitimacy assessments is in the middle of the range, but slightly leaning towards 
the right hand, high legitimacy flank. On a (continuous) scale from zero to ten, the 
average fisherman awards the regime with six legitimacy points.  
 
 
Figure 4. The legitimacy of the fishery regime among Swedish fishermen.  
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Notes: The figure reports the distribution of respondents along a legitimacy scale. Mean value=6. 
n=595. For information on the index construction, see section on Methods and Measures.  
 
The theoretical model of this paper states that legitimacy is dependent on trust in 
authorities (H2). The more a fisherman trust regime institutions, the higher the 
probability that he considers the regime to be legitimate. A closer look at 
fishermen’s trust for fishery institutions such as the Swedish Board of Fisheries 
(SBF) and the EU Commission reveals that the proportion of low-trusters by far 
exceeds the share of high-trusters. The balance of opinion, i.e. the proportion of 
respondents indicating fairly high or very high trust minus the proportion 
indicating very low or fairly low trust is a useful tool to capture the general 
opinion in the Swedish fishery corps. As reported in figure 5 below, the least 
trusted institution is the EU Commission where the balance of opinion is – 55 (6-
61). Nor is the numbers for the Swedish Board of Fisheries (SBF) pleasant reading 
for its representatives with a balance of -34 (18-52). The corresponding numbers 
for the Swedish government are -11 (28-39).  
 
 
                                          
28 For exact wordings of the questions, see the previous section on measures and methods.  
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Figure 5. Fishermen’s trust in SBF, EU Commission and the Swedish government  
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Notes: The data come from a survey to Swedish fishermen. Trust was measured through the 
question “How much do you trust the manner in which the following societal institutions manage 
their work?” Key to abbreviations: SBF= Swedish Board of Fisheries; GOV=government; EUC= 
European Commission. n=SBF 769; GOV 771; EUC 768 
 
Trust in SBF is used as the intermediate variable in our causal model, and the trust 
in government is included in the index of general trust used as a control variable 
in our estimations of how imbalanced burdens, trust and legitimacy relate to each 
other. Having mapped out the aggregated levels of trust and regime legitimacy, we 
now turn to the analysis of these relationships. 
 
How Relative Burdens Impact Legitimacy  
The results suggest mixed support for our package of hypotheses. To begin with, 
the actual “imbalanced burden effects” depend on which of the measures 
(monitoring or concern) we use. There is no support at all for the idea that the 
perceived relative degree of monitoring has negative effects on legitimacy. 
Fishermen perceiving that they are more monitored than other EU fishermen 
regard the regime just as legitimate as the fishermen who do not feel more 
monitored than others. As is indicated in table 1 below, the total effect of 
perceived relative monitoring is zero, and also statistically insignificant.  
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Table 1. Models of burdens effects on legitimacy (unstandardized OLS coefficients) 
Dependent= legitimacy 
Burden=Monitoring 
Dependent=legitimacy 
Burden= concern 
Bivariate b .08 (.57)   .27 (.02)   
 Direct Indirect  Total Direct Indirect  Total 
Monitoring .04 (.75) -,04 0    
Concern    .25 (.04) -.03 .22 
SBF Trust .42 (.000)   .42 (.001)   
Economy -.07 (.63)   -.12 (.42)   
General 
trust 
-.02 (.65)   -.005 (.91)   
Constant 5.2   4.4   
Adjusted R2  .02   .03   
SEE 2.6   2.5   
Notes: The table reports bivariate and multivariate unstandardized OLS coefficients. The effects of 
the two versions of imbalanced burdens are split into direct, indirect and total effects. Entries are 
coefficients and model performance statistics. P-values are in parenthesis. For information on 
coding procedures, see section on Methods, Measures and Model Specification.   
 
While the perceptions of relative monitoring seem irrelevant for understanding 
legitimacy, the perceptions of relative governmental concern have at least some 
such effects. Indeed, the R2 – the proportion of explained variance – is no more 
than .03, indicating that the model explains about three percent of all variance in 
respondents’ grading of regime legitimacy. However, in this case we are more 
interested in the effects of individual variables. The bivariate effect of perceived 
relative concern on legitimacy was .27 (upper section of table 1 above).29 The 
coefficient tells us that Swedish fishermen thinking that other governments are 
more concerned for their fleet tend to regard the regime as more legitimate than 
those thinking that the Swedish government is more concerned than others. Now, 
the question is whether this effect withstands when we control for economy and 
general trust.  
 
The lower section of table 1 reports the results of a multivariate OLS model with 
relative concern, trust in SBF, economy and general trust as independent variables. 
It turns out that the relative concern effect is marginally lowered, but is still 
substantial and statistically significant. Hence, also under control for the relative 
economic situation of each fisherman, their trust in SBF and their general trust, 
the opinion on the relative concern issue has a direct effect on their view on 
regime legitimacy (b=.25). Since the indirect effects channelled through trust are 
negative, the total effect come down at +.22. Interestingly enough, the direct and 
total effects are positive, meaning that those who consider the Swedish 
government to be less concerned for the fishery than others actually have a more 
positive view on the legitimacy of the regime. The direction of the causality hence 
seems to go in the “wrong” direction.  
                                          
29 The correlation coefficient (tau) for the bivariate relationship between perceived relative 
concern and legitimacy was .11; (p=.01) (not presented in the table). 
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The subjective perception of belonging to the fleet of a “friends of the fish” 
country does not seem to lower regime legitimacy. More analyses are required to 
understand this pattern, but we can note that the result also runs contrary to the 
ideas that plain self interest guides the evaluations of the regime. The offended 
fishermen do not necessarily consider the regime to be illegitimate. We can also 
note that the chairman of the Swedish Fishermen’s Interest Organization (SFR) 
might have a point when he questions the media-image of Swedish fishermen as 
“zero-rating pirates” – only interested in their personal gain.30  
 
The perceived imbalance in governmental concern has some negative causal 
effects, however. Figure 6 below summarises the path analysis of how perceived 
relative concern impacts legitimacy. We see that while the relative concern has a 
positive effect on legitimacy, it has a negative effect on trust in SBF (multivariate 
b=-.08). Hence, those who think that other governments are better at taking the 
interests of their fishing industries into consideration tend to perceive the regime 
as more legitimate, but also to have lower trust in the key national fishery 
authority. It seems hence that it is the fishery authorities and not the regime 
regulations that take the blow from fishermen offended by imbalanced burdens. It 
is also interesting to note that imbalance in terms of monitoring has a negative 
effect on trust. (b=-.09; p=.09, not presented in figure or table). The two imbalance 
in burden factors hence go hand in hand in this regard.   
 
Figure 6. Graphic summary of path analysis. Effect of perceived relative governmental concern on 
legitimacy.  
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Notes: Entries are b-values. All coefficients statistically significant at the .05 level.  
 
The intermediate variable in the model, trust, seems to effect legitimacy in 
accordance with our hypothesis H2 to (b=.42). Fishermen with a higher degree of 
confidence in the Swedish Board of Fisheries (SBF), are more prone than their less 
trusting fellows to consider the regime as legitimate. Even though the effects are 
not overwhelmingly high, the results must be regarded as a support for the 
                                          
30 Yrkesfiskaren, September 7, 2007, p.6.  
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hypothesis. In this regard, the results are in line with earlier research that point at 
trust as important for upholding the legitimacy of a regime.  
 
Summary and conclusions 
The empirical findings give mixed support to the model. The most intriguing 
result concerns the impact of fishermen’s assessments regarding the balance in 
burden in relationship to fishermen of other nationalities. Instead of having a 
negative impact on the legitimacy of the regime, fishermen that consider that the 
Swedish government is less concerned with their national fleet are more inclined 
to consider the regime as legitimate. Moreover, diverseness in monitoring between 
countries do not have an impact on regime legitimacy. The factor that runs in the 
expected direction is trust in authorities, which is shown to impact the legitimacy 
of the regime. Moreover, the imbalance in burden is of some importance in order 
to understand fishermen’s trust in authorities.  
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